Introduction
Some responses to the Liar paradox:
Classical: Either deny λ |= T (λ), or deny T (λ) |= λ, (or both).
Paraconsistent: Accept T (λ) ∧ ¬T (λ).
Paracomplete: Deny the validity of excluded-middle, and in particular the validity of: T (λ) ∨ ¬T (λ). In such cases we say that it is indeterminate whether λ is true.
We'll be interested in the paracomplete account.
Target Question: If one ought to believe that φ is indeterminate, what attitude should one take towards φ?
A Puzzle: If φ is a proposition that one ought to believe is indeterminate, then, prima facie the following claims are all plausible:
(a) One should not believe φ.
Justification: In standard cases, if φ is indeterminate, it will entail a contradiction. Thus, belief in φ will mandate belief in a contradiction. But one should not believe a contradiction.
(b) One should not be agnostic about φ.
Justification: In standard cases of indeterminacy we do not think that there is some fact of the matter about which we are ignorant.
(c) One should not reject, i.e., disbelieve, φ.
Justification: If one rejects φ, then one should believe ¬φ. This, however, again mandates belief in a contradiction.
A solution to this puzzle should tell us which of (a)-(c) to reject.
A Putative Solution: Reject (c). This requires rejecting the claim that if one rejects φ, then one should believe ¬φ.
This proposed solution to the puzzle leads to the following orthodox answer to our question: (Rejection): If one ought to believe that φ is indeterminate, then one ought to reject, i.e., disbelieve, φ.
(Indeterminacy): If one ought to believe that φ is indeterminate, then one ought to be such that it is indeterminate whether one believes φ.
Epistemic Paradox
A Strange Sentence: I don't believe that this sentence is true Using this type of sentence we can argue that the following three principles are (classically) inconsistent:
(Evidence): For any proposition φ, if an agent's evidence makes φ certain, then the agent is rationally required to believe φ.
(Consistency): For any proposition φ, it is a rational requirement that an agent be such that if it believes φ then it not believe ¬φ. (Read: O(Bφ → ¬B¬φ)) (Possibility): Given a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive doxastic options (e.g., {Bφ, ¬Bφ}), there must always be some option such that it is possible for an agent, who is not already guilty of a rational failing, to realize that option and not incur rational criticism in so doing.
Let B mean 'I believe that...'. Let 'b' name the sentence '¬BT (b)'. As an instance of the T-schema we have:
We assume:
We assume further:
Given (2) - (4), we can prove that the following hold given (Evidence) and (Consistency):
Fact 1: On the assumption that I believe that b is true, it follows that I ought not believe that b is true.
Fact 2: On the assumption that I do not believe that b is true, it follows that I ought to believe that b is true.
Facts 1 and 2 show that (Evidence) and (Consistency) are (classically) inconsistent with (Possibility).
The Paracomplete Solution
Represent my doxastic state using a set of (paracomplete) possible worlds. To capture the stipulated facts about me we let the accessibility relation on this set of worlds be an equivalence relation. Taking B to be a universal quantifier over the set of such worlds we have:
• I satisfy (2) - (4) Justification: (2) and (3) are guaranteed to hold given that accessibility is an equivalence relation. Since T (b) ↔ ¬BT (b) is a theorem, it holds at every point, thus (4) holds.
• I satisfy (Consistency) Justification: Bφ → ¬B¬φ holds in any such space (assuming B is a universal quantifier over possible worlds).
• I satisfy (Evidence) Justification: (Evidence) is essentially a restricted closure requirement. It says that an agent should believe all of the logical consequences of a restricted set of its beliefs, viz., its evidential base. It is a trivial consequence of our representing my doxastic state by a set of possible worlds that my beliefs are closed under logical consequence. I will, therefore, satisfy the restricted closure requirement imposed by (Evidence).
Moral: If we allow that excluded-middle fails for the claim that I believes that b is true, I can satisfy both (Consistency) and (Evidence). Indeed, this is the only way that I can satisfy (Consistency) and (Evidence) by paracomplete lights.
Claim: One way to rationally satisfy (Consistency) and (Evidence) is for it to be indeterminate whether I believe that b is true.
An Argument Against (Rejection)
If we want to hold on to (Consistency), (Evidence) and (Possibility), we should reject (Rejection).
Justification: The following is a theorem:
Claim: I cannot, in the same way, satisfy (Consistency), (Evidence) and (Rejection).
Argument:
• We've assumed that in meeting (Consistency) and (Evidence) we have: I¬BT (b).
• By (7) we have: BI¬BT (b).
• Together with (6), this ensures that my evidence makes it certain that IT (b).
• If I satisfies (Evidence) we have: BIT (b).
• Assuming that I satisfy (Rejection) we have: RT (b) and so ¬BT (b).
• But as we have seen on the assumption that ¬BT (b) it follows that I must violate (Evidence).
This argument cannot be blocked in the same way as our earlier epistemic paradox. No appeal is made to excluded-middle or any other logical laws or inferences that are contentious by paracomplete lights.
Claim: If we need to choose between giving up either (Consistency), (Evidence), (Possibility) or (Rejection) we should give up (Rejection).
An Argument for (Indeterminacy)
Consider again our original puzzle. The orthodox solution to this puzzle is to reject the claim that rational disbelief in φ rationally mandates belief in ¬φ. But we have seen that this leads to a problematic conclusion.
A Second Solution to our Puzzle: Reject each of (a) -(c). Instead, I claim that if φ is a proposition that one rationally believes is indeterminate, we should accept the following: (a ) One should not determinately believe φ.
(b ) One should not be determinately agnostic about φ.
(c ) One should not determinately reject φ.
An Error Theory: We are not good at distinguishing between something being the case and its determinately being the case. It should not be unexpected, then, that we should confuse the true principles (a ) -(c ) for the incorrect (a) -(c).
Claim: (Indeterminacy) is a consequence of (a ) -(c ).
Claim: I can satisfy (Consistency), (Evidence), and (Indeterminacy).
